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OPINION  OF  THE  COURT 
 
________________ 
AMBRO, 
We address for the first time the use of cy pres 
distributions in class action settlements.
Circuit Judge 
1
                                              
1 Although Judge Weis briefly discussed the desirability of cy 
pres distributions in a partial concurrence and dissent, the 
majority in that case did not address the issue.  See In re Pet 
  “The term ‘cy pres’ 
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is derived from the Norman French expression cy pres comme 
possible, which means ‘as near as possible.’”  Democratic 
Cent. Comm. v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm’n, 84 
F.3d 451, 455 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1996).2
                                                                                                     
Food Prods. Liab. Litig., 629 F.3d 333, 363–64 (3d Cir. 
2010) (Weis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
  When class actions are 
resolved through settlement, it may be difficult to distribute 
the entire settlement fund, after paying attorneys’ fees and 
costs along with fund administration expenses, directly to its 
intended beneficiaries—the class members.  Money may 
remain unclaimed if class members cannot be located, decline 
to file claims, have died, or the parties have overestimated the 
amount projected for distribution for some other reason.  It 
may also be economically or administratively infeasible to 
distribute funds to class members if, for example, the cost of 
distributing individually to all class members exceeds the 
amount to be distributed.  In these circumstances, courts have 
permitted the parties to distribute to a nonparty (or 
nonparties) the excess settlement funds for their next best 
use—a charitable purpose reasonably approximating the 
interests pursued by the class.   
2 The cy pres doctrine originated in trusts-and-estates law as a 
rule of construction used to preserve testamentary charitable 
gifts that otherwise would fail.  “When it becomes impossible 
to carry out the charitable gift as the testator intended, the 
doctrine allows the ‘next best’ use of the funds to satisfy the 
testator’s intent ‘as near as possible.’”  Id. (quoting Natalie A. 
DeJarlais, Note, The Consumer Trust Fund: A Cy Pres 
Solution to Undistributed Funds in Consumer Class Actions, 
38 Hastings L.J. 729, 730 (1987)).   
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The cy pres award in this case was part of a settlement 
of consolidated antitrust class actions brought by several 
named plaintiffs (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”) on behalf of 
consumers against retailers Toys “R” Us, Inc. and Babies “R” 
Us, Inc. along with several baby product manufacturers (the 
retailers and manufacturers are collectively referred to as the 
“Defendants”).  Pursuant to that settlement, which was 
approved by the District Court, all settlement funds remaining 
after attorneys’ fees and costs are paid, and individual 
distributions are made to claimants, would go to one or more 
charitable organizations proposed by the parties and selected 
by the Court.  The Court indicated it would ensure the funds 
are used for a purpose underlying the interests of the class. 
Kevin Young, an unnamed class member who objected 
to the settlement before the District Court, raises the 
following three issues relating to the cy pres provision on 
appeal.3
(1) The District Court erred in approving a settlement 
that would result in funds being distributed to one or more cy 
   
                                              
3 Three of the objectors to the settlement—Young, Clark 
Hampe, and Allison Lederer—have appealed, but only Young 
has filed briefing. Because the underlying suits alleged 
violations of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, the District 
Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 
& 1337.   
Our Court has appellate jurisdiction because this is a 
timely filed appeal from a final judgment.  28 U.S.C § 1291.  
Although the objectors were not parties to the underlying 
action, as class members who timely objected to the approval 
of the settlement at a fairness hearing, they are permitted to 
appeal the settlement without the need to intervene formally.  
See Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 14 (2002). 
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pres recipients in lieu of fully compensating class members 
for their losses.  
(2) The Court should have discounted the value of the 
cy pres distribution for purposes of calculating attorneys’ 
fees, which were awarded on a percentage-of-recovery basis.   
(3) The class notice was deficient because it did not 
identify the recipients that would receive the cy pres 
distributions.  
Young’s overarching concern, and ours as well, is that 
the settlement has resulted in a troubling and, according to 
counsel for the parties, surprising allocation of the settlement 
fund.  Cy pres distributions, while in our view permissible, 
are inferior to direct distributions to the class because they 
only imperfectly serve the purpose of the underlying causes 
of action—to compensate class members.  Though the parties 
contemplated that excess funds would be distributed to 
charity after the bulk of the settlement fund was distributed to 
class members through an exhaustive claims process,  it 
appears the actual allocation will be just the opposite.  
Defendants paid $35,500,000 into a settlement fund.  About 
$14,000,000 will go to class counsel in attorneys’ fees and 
expenses.  Of the remainder, it is expected that roughly 
$3,000,000 will be distributed to class members, while the 
rest—approximately $18,500,000 less administrative 
expenses—will be distributed to one or more cy pres 
recipients.   
We vacate the District Court’s approval of the 
settlement because the Court was apparently unaware of the 
amount of the fund that would be distributed to cy pres 
beneficiaries rather than being distributed directly to the class.  
On remand, the Court should consider whether this or any 
alternative settlement provides sufficient direct benefit to the 
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class before giving its approval.  We also vacate the 
attorneys’ fees award because its approval was based on the 
terms of a settlement that are no longer in effect and may be 
altered on remand.  Addressing Young’s argument that 
attorneys’ fees should be reduced, we confirm that courts 
need to consider the level of direct benefit provided to the 
class in calculating attorneys’ fees.  We leave it to the District 
Court’s discretion to assess what effect, if any, that 
consideration should have on any future fee award in this 
case.  As there was no error in the notice provided to the 
class, we do not reverse on that basis.  
I. Background 
This appeal follows from two antitrust class actions 
consolidated for settlement purposes.  In 2006, Carol 
McDonough and other named plaintiffs filed a suit in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania alleging that Defendants conspired to set a price 
floor for the sale of certain baby products, causing consumers 
to pay increased prices for these products.  In 2009, class 
certification of that resale-price-maintenance suit was granted 
and several subclasses were created based on the products 
purchased and the timeframe of those purchases.  Because the 
District Court did not permit the subclass periods to extend 
beyond the date when the case was filed, Ariel Elliott and 
other named plaintiffs subsequently filed a related putative 
class action.  In 2011, the parties in those actions signed an 
agreement consolidating and settling their lawsuits.   
The Court initially approved the settlement in January 
2011.  Notice was sent to putative class members informing 
them of their right to submit a claim, opt out, or object.  In 
July 2011, the Court held a fairness hearing to consider any 
objections made by class members.  The deadline for 
submitting claims expired in August 2011.  Approximately 
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four months later, the Court approved the settlement and a 
fund allocation plan proposed by the parties.  It also granted 
class counsel’s fee request for $11,833,333.33, representing 
one-third of the gross settlement amount, and $2,229,775.60 
for out-of-pocket litigation expenses. 
Per the settlement, Defendants deposited $35,500,000 
into a settlement fund.  After payment of attorneys’ fees and 
expenses, the remainder of the fund was slated for 
distribution to the settlement class.4
Claimants are entitled to different levels of 
compensation based on the evidence submitted.  Those who 
submit valid documentary proof of purchase and of the actual 
price paid for a product are eligible to receive 20% of the 
actual purchase price of each product purchased.  Those who 
do not submit documentary proof of the actual purchase price 
but submit a valid proof of purchase are eligible to receive 
20% of the estimated retail price, as calculated by class 
counsel, of each product purchased.
  In order to receive a cash 
distribution, a claimant must demonstrate that he or she is a 
member of a settlement subclass by submitting a valid, sworn, 
and timely claim form.   
5
                                              
4 The settlement class is comprised of all persons and entities 
who bought certain baby products from Babies “R” Us and 
Toys “R” Us during prescribed time periods dating back to 
1999. 
  (The 20% figure 
5 Under the allocation plan, valid documentary proof “may 
include but is not limited to receipts, cancelled checks, credit 
card statements, records from Toys ‘R’ Us or Babies ‘R’ Us, 
or other records that show the Authorized Claimant purchased 
the Settlement Product(s) from Toys ‘R’ Us or Babies ‘R’ Us, 
and when the purchase was made.”  
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slightly exceeds the 18% average overcharge an independent 
economics expert hired by class counsel estimated class 
members would have paid for a baby product covered by the 
settlement.)  Those who do not submit any proof of purchase 
are eligible to receive a payment of $5.   
Claims in the first two categories of compensation—
those receiving 20% of the actual or estimated purchase 
price—are subject to pro rata enhancements.  The settlement 
class is divided into eight different settlement subclasses, 
based on the baby product purchased.  If the claims awarded 
do not exhaust the funds allocated to a particular settlement 
subclass, these awards are enhanced by up to three times the 
baseline figure, consistent with Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 
15 U.S.C. § 15, which entitles private plaintiffs to receive 
treble damages for violations of the antitrust laws.   
 The settlement terms establish an order of priority for 
distributing any remaining funds.  Funds in a subclass after 
the initial distribution will be redistributed first to the other 
settlement classes until all claims are fully satisfied in 
accordance with the compensation categories and 
accompanying enhancements described.  If funds remain after 
that redistribution and the payment of administrative costs, 
they will be donated to one or more charitable 
organizations—the cy pres recipients.  Under the terms of the 
settlement, Plaintiffs and Defendants are each permitted to 
recommend up to two not-for-profit organizations to receive 
the award.  The District Court, however, is entrusted with the 
responsibility of selecting one or more cy pres recipients that 
will receive distributions.   
We do not know the exact allocation of the funds that 
will result from the current settlement.  At the time of the 
fairness hearing in July 2011, class members had submitted 
approximately 41,000 claims.  Because the deadline for 
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submissions was not until August 2011, more claims likely 
were submitted.  In response to a concern regarding whether 
the $35,500,000 in the settlement fund would be sufficient to 
pay counsel fees and expenses while compensating class 
members under the terms of the agreement, the District Court 
estimated that at most—assuming 45,000 claims, each 
entitling the claimant to three times 20% of a $300 baby 
product—$8,100,000 would be distributed to class members.  
It appears, however, that far less will actually be distributed 
to them.  At oral argument, class and defense counsel 
informed us that, largely because the vast majority of the 
claims fell into the third category of compensation entitling 
claimants to $5 payouts, class members will receive only 
about $3,000,000 through the claims process.   
II. Cy pres 
We have not ruled on whether class action settlements 
may include cy pres provisions.  Courts generally have 
approved cy pres distributions in two circumstances. 
First, many courts allow a 
settlement that directs funds to a 
third party when funds are left 
over after all individual claims 
have been satisfied. . . .  Second, 
some courts allow a settlement to 
require a payment only to a third 
party, that is, to provide no 
recovery at all directly to class 
members.  
American Law Institute (“ALI”), Principles of the Law of 
Aggregate Litig. § 3.07, comment a (2010).  We deal with the 
former here. 
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The use of cy pres recipients to dispose of excess 
funds—first suggested in a student comment in 1972, see 
Stewart R. Shepherd, Comment, Damage Distribution in 
Class Actions: The Cy Pres Remedy, 39 U. Chi. L. Rev. 448 
(1972)—has accelerated rapidly in recent years.  
From 1974 through 2000, federal 
courts granted or approved cy 
pres awards to third party 
charities in thirty class actions, or 
an average of approximately once 
per year.  [From] 2001 [through 
2008], federal courts granted or 
approved cy pres awards in sixty-
five class actions, or an average of 
roughly eight per year. 
Martin H. Redish et al., Cy Pres Relief and the Pathologies of 
the Modern Class Action: A Normative and Empirical 
Analysis, 62 Fla. L. Rev. 617, 653 (2010).   
This is unsurprising.  When excess settlement funds 
remain after claimants have received the distribution they are 
entitled to under the terms of the settlement agreement, there 
are three principal options for distributing the remaining 
funds—reversion to the defendant, escheat to the state, or 
distribution of the funds cy pres.6
                                              
6 As we discuss directly below, the parties may also agree to 
make further distributions to class members (e.g., expand 
eligibility for payments and/or lower the requirements for 
making a successful claim). 
  Among these options, cy 
pres distributions have benefits over the alternative choices.  
Reversion to the defendant risks undermining the deterrent 
effect of class actions by rewarding defendants for the failure 
15 
 
of class members to collect their share of the settlement.  
Escheat to the state preserves the deterrent effect of class 
actions, but it benefits the community at large rather than 
those harmed by the defendant’s conduct.  Cy pres 
distributions also preserve the deterrent effect, but (at least 
theoretically) more closely tailor the distribution to the 
interests of class members, including those absent members 
who have not received individual distributions.   
We join other courts of appeals in holding that a 
district court does not abuse its discretion by approving a 
class action settlement agreement that includes a cy pres 
component directing the distribution of excess settlement 
funds to a third party to be used for a purpose related to the 
class injury.7
                                              
7 In contrast with cy pres distributions agreed to by the parties 
as part of a settlement, courts of appeals have greeted with 
more skepticism cy pres distributions imposed by trial courts 
over the objections of the parties.  See, e.g., Klier v. Elf 
Atochem N. Am., Inc., 658 F.3d 468, 479 (5th Cir. 2011) (en 
banc) (“Where the terms of a settlement agreement are 
sufficiently clear, or, more accurately, insufficient to 
overcome the presumption that the settlement provides for 
further distribution to class members, there is no occasion for 
charitable gifts, and cy pres must remain offstage.” (footnote 
omitted)).  We do not deal with that situation here.   
  See Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 819–
20 (9th Cir. 2012); In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale 
Price Litig., 588 F.3d 24, 33–36 (1st Cir. 2009); see also 4 
Herbert B. Newberg et al., Newberg on Class Actions § 11:20 
(4th ed. 2012); ALI, supra, § 3.07.  “The claims, issues, or 
defenses of a certified class may be settled, voluntarily 
dismissed, or compromised only with the court’s approval.”  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e).  That approval is warranted when the 
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court finds that the settlement, taken as a whole,  is “fair, 
reasonable, and adequate” from the perspective of the class.  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2).  Inclusion of a cy pres provision by 
itself does not render a settlement unfair, unreasonable, or 
inadequate. 
We caution, however, that direct distributions to the 
class are preferred over cy pres distributions.  The private 
causes of action aggregated in this class action—as in many 
others—were created by Congress to allow plaintiffs to 
recover compensatory damages for their injuries.  See 15 
U.S.C. § 15.  Cy pres distributions imperfectly serve that 
purpose by substituting for that direct compensation an 
indirect benefit that is at best attenuated and at worse 
illusory.8
                                              
8 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, under which this class 
settlement was approved, is a procedural mechanism 
permitting the aggregation of claims in federal court.  
Pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act, it does not and cannot 
alter the underlying substantive law being asserted.  28 U.S.C. 
§ 2072.  Because “a district court’s certification of a 
settlement simply recognizes the parties’ deliberate decision 
to bind themselves according to mutually agreed-upon terms 
without engaging in any substantive adjudication of the 
underlying causes of action,” Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 
F.3d 273, 312 (3d Cir. 2011), we do not believe the inclusion 
of a cy pres provision in a settlement runs counter to the 
Rules Enabling Act.  But see Klier, 658 F.3d at 481 (Jones, J., 
concurring) (suggesting that cy pres distributions arguably 
violate the Rules Enabling Act and present Article III 
problems); In re Pet Food Prods. Liab. Litig., 629 F.3d 333, 
362 (3d Cir. 2010) (Weis, J., concurring and dissenting) 
(suggesting that excess funds should escheat to the state 
  Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 356 F.3d 781, 
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784–85 (7th Cir. 2004).  Cy pres distributions also present a 
potential conflict of interest between class counsel and their 
clients because the inclusion of a cy pres distribution may 
increase a settlement fund, and with it attorneys’ fees, without 
increasing the direct benefit to the class.  Where a court fears 
counsel is conflicted, it should subject the settlement to 
increased scrutiny.9
To account for the inferiority of cy pres distributions, 
the ALI has published guidelines limiting them to instances 
where further individual distributions are infeasible.  Those 
guidelines provide in pertinent part: 
 
If the settlement involves 
individual distributions to class 
members and funds remain after 
distributions (because some class 
members could not be identified 
or chose not to participate), the 
settlement should presumptively 
provide for further distributions to 
participating class members 
unless the amounts involved are 
too small to make individual 
                                                                                                     
instead of being distributed to cy pres recipients).  The Rules 
Enabling Act, however, provides further support for the 
proposition that courts should favor class settlements that 
provide direct compensation to the class through individual 
distributions. 
9 As discussed in the next section, see infra Part III, it may 
also be appropriate to decrease attorneys’ fees in those 
circumstances. 
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distributions economically viable 
or other specific reasons exist that 
would make such further 
distributions impossible or unfair. 
ALI, supra, § 3.07(b).  The ALI does not explain further what 
“other specific reasons” would justify a cy pres distribution.   
Although we agree with the ALI that cy pres 
distributions are most appropriate where further individual 
distributions are economically infeasible, we decline to hold 
that cy pres distributions are only appropriate in this context.  
Settlements are private contracts reflecting negotiated 
compromises.  Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 312.  The role of a 
district court is not to determine whether the settlement is the 
fairest possible resolution—a task particularly ill-advised 
given that the likelihood of success at trial (on which all 
settlements are based) can only be estimated imperfectly.  
The Court must determine whether the compromises reflected 
in the settlement—including those terms relating to the 
allocation of settlement funds—are fair, reasonable, and 
adequate when considered from the perspective of the class as 
a whole.  
To assess whether a settlement containing a cy pres 
provision satisfies this requirement, courts should employ the 
same framework developed for assessing other aspects of 
class action settlements.  In Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153 (3d 
Cir. 1975), we set out nine factors that courts should consider 
when deciding whether to approve a settlement.  Id. at 157.  
In In re Prudential Insurance Co. of America Sales Practices 
Litigation, 148 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 1998), we expanded that 
analysis to include what may be termed the Prudential 
considerations.  Id. at 323.  Unlike the Girsh factors, each of 
which the district court must consider before approving a 
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class settlement, the Prudential considerations are just that, 
prudential.  They are permissive and non-exhaustive, 
“illustrat[ing] . . . [the] additional inquiries that in many 
instances will be useful for a thoroughgoing analysis of a 
settlement’s terms.”  See In re Pet Food, 629 F.3d at 350.   
We add today that one of the additional inquiries for a 
thorough analysis of settlement terms is the degree of direct 
benefit provided to the class.  In making this determination, a 
district court may consider, among other things, the number 
of individual awards compared to both the number of claims 
and the estimated number of class members, the size of the 
individual awards compared to claimants’ estimated damages, 
and the claims process used to determine individual awards.  
Barring sufficient justification, cy pres awards should 
generally represent a small percentage of total settlement 
funds. 
We note that this inquiry needs to be, as much as 
possible, practical and not abstract.  If “the parties have not” 
on their own initiative “supplied the information needed” to 
make the necessary findings, the court should “affirmatively 
seek out such information.”  In re Pet Food, 629 F.3d at 351 
(citation omitted).  Making these findings may also require a 
court to withhold final approval of a settlement until the 
actual distribution of funds can be estimated with reasonable 
accuracy.  Alternatively, a court may urge the parties to 
implement a settlement structure that attempts to maintain an 
appropriate balance between payments to the class and cy 
pres awards.  For instance, it could condition approval of a 
settlement on the inclusion of a mechanism for additional 
payouts to individual class members if the number of 
claimants turns out to be insufficient to deplete a significant 
portion of the total settlement fund.   
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Turning to the particular cy pres distribution in this 
case, Young asserts that the District Court failed to fulfill its 
oversight responsibility by approving a class action settlement 
containing a cy pres provision that permits the distribution of 
funds to a third party without first fully compensating all 
claimants.  As noted above, the settlement directs a cy pres 
award after claimants receive cash distributions via a three-
tiered compensation structure:  claimants with valid 
documentary proof of purchase and purchase price receive up 
to three times 20% of the actual price of the product they 
purchased; claimants with valid documentary proof of 
purchase receive up to three times 20% of the estimated price; 
and claimants without any valid proof receive a $5 payout.  
Young does not object to the 20% figure or argue that the first 
two categories of claimants will be undercompensated.  
Instead, he asserts that the cy pres award is inappropriate 
because the third category of claimants—those receiving a $5 
payout regardless of price of the product they purchased—
will not be fully compensated for their losses.  
We review a district court’s decision to approve a 
settlement for abuse of discretion.  Girsh, 521 F.2d at 156 & 
n.7.  “‘An appellate court may find an abuse of discretion 
where the district court’s decision rests upon a clearly 
erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an 
improper application of law to fact.’”  In re Prudential, 148 
F.3d at 299 (quoting In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck 
Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 783 (3d Cir. 
1995)).  Mindful that we are dealing with a settlement, we 
remain hesitant to undo an agreement that has resolved a 
hard-fought, multi-year litigation.  See In re Warfarin Sodium 
Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 535 (3d Cir. 2004).  “Because 
class actions are rife with potential conflicts of interest 
between class counsel and class members,” however, “district 
judges presiding over such actions are expected to give 
careful scrutiny to the terms of proposed settlement in order 
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to make sure that class counsel are behaving as honest 
fiduciaries for the class as a whole.”  Mirfasihi, 356 F.3d at 
785 (collecting cases); see also In re Gen. Motors, 55 F.3d at 
785. 
We vacate the District Court’s orders approving the 
settlement and the fund allocation plan because it did not 
have the factual basis necessary to determine whether the 
settlement was fair to the entire class.  Most importantly, it 
did not know the amount of compensation that will be 
distributed directly to the class.  Removing attorneys’ fees 
and expenses, approximately $21,500,000 (less costs of 
administration) of the settlement were designated for the 
class, but only around $3,000,000 of that amount actually will 
be distributed to class members, with the remainder going to 
cy pres recipients after expenses relating to the administration 
of the fund are paid.   
Though the claims period had concluded, counsel did 
not provide this information to the Court, preventing it from 
properly assessing whether the settlement was in the best 
interest of the class as a whole.  The Court approved the $5 
cap on compensation for those without documentary proof of 
their claims in part because it believed the standard of proof 
required to receive a higher award was “fairly low.”  
McDonough v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 834 F. Supp. 2d 329, 352 
(E.D. Pa. 2011).  According to counsel, however, the vast 
majority of claimants have not submitted documentary proof 
entitling them to a greater award, casting doubt on this 
assumption.  Similarly, the Court found the $5 cap was 
justified by the need to “avoid encouraging fraud.”  Id.  While 
without doubt this is a good goal, we do not believe the Court 
could have reasonably assessed whether these concerns 
justified the cap without knowing the resulting allocation of 
funds.  Other means of preventing fraud could have been 
explored. 
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Based on the information we now have, we remand for 
the Court to reconsider the fairness of the settlement.  The 
parties may wish to alter its terms on remand to provide 
greater direct benefit to the class, such as by increasing the $5 
payment or lowering the evidentiary bar for receiving a 
higher award.10
We place no absolute requirement on the amount of 
direct compensation the third category of claimants must 
receive.  Courts of appeals have approved cy pres 
distributions where all class members submitting claims have 
already been fully compensated for their damages by prior 
distributions.  See, e.g., In re Lupron Mktg. & Sales Practices 
Litig., 677 F.3d 21, 34–35 (1st Cir. 2012).  A cy pres 
distribution is considered appropriate in that circumstance 
because additional individual distributions would 
“overcompensat[e] claimant class members at the expense of 
absent class members.”  Id. at 35 (citing In re Pharm. Indus., 
588 F.3d at 34–36).  We agree, but do not limit cy pres 
distributions to instances where all claimants have received 
100% of their estimated damages.  As the parties explain, the 
$5 payment to claimants in the third category can be seen as 
compensation for a full release of their claims rather than as 
an attempt to compensate them for their damages.  Indeed, 
provided the class as a whole received sufficient direct 
benefit, it would not have been unreasonable to eliminate the 
$5 category altogether and require class members to submit 
documentary proof to receive any award.  We do not intend to 
  After allowing them that opportunity, we ask 
the Court to make the factual findings necessary to evaluate 
whether the settlement provides sufficient direct benefit to the 
class. 
                                              
10 Class members should be notified of any material 
alterations to the settlement and permitted to object to them 
before the Court approves the settlement. 
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raise the bar for obtaining approval of a class action 
settlement simply because it includes a cy pres provision. 
What we are concerned with in this case is that the 
Court approved the settlement without being made aware that 
almost all claimants would fall into the $5 compensation 
category, resulting in minimal (and we doubt sufficient) 
compensation going directly to class members.  The baby 
products at issue cost up to $300, resulting in damages, at the 
estimated 18% overcharge, of over $50.  Combined with the 
possibility of treble damages, we doubt that this is the type of 
small claims case where the potential awards were necessarily 
insufficient to motivate class members to file claims.  We 
think it more likely that many class members did not submit 
claims because they lacked the documentary proof necessary 
to receive the higher awards contemplated, and the $5 award 
they could receive left them apathetic.  This casts doubt on 
whether agreeing to a settlement with such a restrictive claims 
process was in the best interest of the class.  If Defendants 
decline to raise the $5 cap or alter the documentary proof 
requirement on remand, the Court will need to determine 
whether the class received sufficient direct benefit to justify 
the settlement as fair, reasonable, and adequate.  Before doing 
so, though, it must have the requisite factual basis. 
III. Attorneys’ Fees 
“In a certified class action, the court may award 
reasonable attorney’s fees and nontaxable costs that are 
authorized by law or by the parties’ agreement.”  Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 23(h).  Courts generally use one of two methods for 
assessing the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees—a 
percentage-of-recovery method or a lodestar method.  The 
former “resembles a contingent fee in that it awards counsel a 
variable percentage of the amount recovered for the class.”  In 
re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. 
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Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 819 n.38 (3d Cir. 1995).  The latter 
“calculates fees by multiplying the number of hours expended 
by some hourly rate appropriate for the region and for the 
experience of the lawyer.”  Id. at 819 n.37.  Whichever 
method is chosen, “we have noted previously that ‘it is 
sensible for a court to use a second method of fee approval to 
cross check’ its initial fee calculation.”  In re Prudential Ins. 
Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 333 (3d Cir. 
1998) (quoting In re Gen. Motors, 55 F.3d at 820).  
The District Court—as is “generally favored in cases 
involving a common fund,” id.—awarded fees on a 
percentage-of-recovery basis.  We have identified a number 
of factors to aid courts in evaluating the reasonableness of 
percentage fee awards.  In re Diet Drugs Prod. Liab. Litig., 
582 F.3d 524, 541 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Gunter v. Ridgewood 
Energy Corp., 223 F.3d 190, 195 n.1 (3d Cir. 2000); In re 
Prudential, 148 F.3d at 336–40).  Applying these factors, the 
Court approved counsel’s requested fees of $11,833,333.33 
(one-third of the entire settlement fund) as reasonable.  In 
addition to using a percentage of recovery method, the Court 
applied a lodestar method crosscheck.  It calculated, at 
counsel’s regular billing rates, a total lodestar of 
$31,839,355.33, representing a negative lodestar multiplier of 
.37 (i.e., class counsel’s fee request equaled 37 percent of 
what they would have received at their regular billing rates).   
We vacate the District Court’s order awarding fees and 
costs because it is based on a settlement that is no longer in 
effect and may be altered on remand.  Although in this 
circumstance we need not (and do not) resolve whether the 
awarded fees were reasonable, we note that the Court did not 
address an issue raised by Young we believe worthy of 
discussion.  He objected to the requested fees on the ground 
that the Court should not consider the cy pres award as a class 
benefit for purposes of calculating attorneys’ fees.  On appeal, 
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Young has softened his approach, asking instead that we 
require districts courts to discount—rather than to ignore 
entirely—the value of cy pres distributions for purposes of 
calculating percentage awards.  See Young Reply Br. at 22.  
Take, for example, a settlement fund whereby $20,000,000 
will be distributed for cy pres purposes.  Under Young’s 
approach, if a court believes that the cy pres award provides 
half the benefit of direct distributions, it should value the 
portion of the settlement being distributed cy pres at 
$10,000,000 for purposes of calculating attorneys’ fees as a 
percentage of the recovery. 
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed 
whether attorneys’ fees should be reduced when a portion of a 
settlement fund is distributed cy pres, it has confronted 
essentially the same issue when calculating percentage fee 
awards against a settlement fund that will partially revert to 
the defendant.  In Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472 
(1980), the Supreme Court confirmed the permissibility of 
using the entire fund as the appropriate benchmark, at least 
where each class member needed only to prove his or her 
membership in the injured class to receive a distribution.11
Courts of appeals have taken a similar approach when 
they have addressed this issue in the cy pres context.  In Six 
Mexican Workers v. Arizona Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301 
  
Id. at 480–81.  Boeing, however, did not address whether a 
district court abuses its discretion by taking the converse 
approach, basing attorneys’ fees on only the amount of the 
fund claimed by class members.   
                                              
11 In Boeing, the fund was created following the 
determination of plaintiffs’ claims rather than pursuant to a 
settlement.  Id. at 474–75.  We do not believe this 
significantly alters the analysis. 
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(9th Cir. 1990), the District Court had calculated attorneys’ 
fees as a percentage of the total fund even though unclaimed 
funds would be distributed to cy pres recipients.  The Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, relying on Boeing, held that the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion in using the total 
fund amount as its benchmark.  Id. at 1311.  In Masters v. 
Wilhelmina Model Agency, Inc., 473 F.3d 423 (2d Cir. 2007), 
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed a 
percentage-fee award based on funds claimed by class 
members rather than on the entire settlement fund, some of 
which would ultimately be distributed to a cy pres recipient.  
Finding that the District Court abused its discretion, the 
Circuit Court held that the percentage fee should have been 
calculated on the basis of the total fees made available 
because “[t]he entire [settlement] [f]und, and not some 
portion thereof, [was] created through the efforts of counsel.”  
Id. at 437.  It noted, however, that a court may within its 
discretion decrease the percentage of the fund awarded (rather 
than the benchmark value of the settlement) in appropriate 
circumstances to prevent attorneys from being improperly 
enriched.  Id. 
We think it unwise to impose, as Young requests, a 
rule requiring district courts to discount attorneys’ fees when 
a portion of an award will be distributed cy pres.12
                                              
12 Young also asks us to hold that fee awards exceeding the 
amount directly distributed to class members are 
presumptively unreasonable.  For substantially similar 
reasons, we do not adopt such a rule.  
  There are 
a variety of reasons that settlement funds may remain even 
after an exhaustive claims process—including if the class 
members’ individual damages are simply too small to 
motivate them to submit claims.  Class counsel should not be 
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penalized for these or other legitimate reasons unrelated to the 
quality of representation they provided.  Nor do we want to 
discourage counsel from filing class actions in cases where 
few claims are likely to be made but the deterrent effect of the 
class action is equally valuable.   
We appreciate, however, that awarding attorneys’ fees 
based on the entire settlement amount rather than individual 
distributions creates a potential conflict of interest between 
absent class members and their counsel.  “Arrangements such 
as [these] . . . decouple class counsel’s financial incentives 
from those of the class. . . . They potentially undermine the 
underlying purposes of class actions by providing defendants 
with a powerful means to enticing class counsel to settle 
lawsuits in a manner detrimental to the class.”  Int’l Precious 
Metals Corp. v. Waters, 530 U.S. 1223, 1224 (2000) (denial 
of cert.) (O’Connor, J.) (discussing a percentage fee 
calculated against the entire settlement fund even though a 
significant portion would revert to the defendant).  Class 
members are not indifferent to whether funds are distributed 
to them or to cy pres recipients, and class counsel should not 
be either.   
Where a district court has reason to believe that 
counsel has not met its responsibility to seek an award that 
adequately prioritizes direct benefit to the class, we therefore 
think it appropriate for the court to decrease the fee award.  
See Masters, 473 F.3d at 437; Williams v. MGM-Pathe 
Commc’ns Co., 129 F.3d 1026, 1027 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating 
that although the entire common fund was the appropriate 
benchmark for attorneys’ fees, the percentage of the fund 
awarded may be decreased “to account for any unusual 
circumstances”); In re Heartland Payment Sys., Inc. 
Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 
1077 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (“The class benefit conferred by cy 
pres payments is indirect and attenuated.  That makes it 
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inappropriate to value cy pres on a dollar-for-dollar basis.”); 
cf. Dennis v. Kellogg Co., 697 F.3d 858, 867–68 (9th Cir. 
2012) (vacating an attorneys’ fees award because the District 
Court did not sufficiently scrutinize the valuation of a cy pres 
distribution consisting of “$5.5. million worth” of food, and 
noting that “[t]his issue is particularly critical with a cy pres 
product settlement that has a tenuous relationship to the class 
allegedly damaged by the conduct in question”).13
For the reasons discussed, our approach is case by 
case, providing courts discretion to determine whether to 
decrease attorneys’ fees where a portion of a fund will be 
distributed cy pres.  The ALI has adopted a similar approach.  
According to its Principles of the Law of Aggregate 
Litigation, “[a]ttorneys’ fees in class actions, whether by 
litigated judgment or by settlement, should be based on both 
the actual value of the judgment or settlement to the class and 
the value of cy pres awards . . . .”  ALI, Principles of the Law 
of Aggregate Litig. § 3.13.  The comment to that section 
clarifies, however, that “because cy pres payments . . . only 
indirectly benefit the class, the court need not give such 
payments the same full value for purposes of setting 
attorneys’ fees as would be given to direct recoveries by the 
class.”  Id. § 3.13, comment a.   
   
                                              
13 We note that, in enacting the Class Action Fairness Act, 
Congress required courts to base attorneys’ fees in coupon (as 
opposed to cash) settlements “on the value to class members 
of the coupons that are redeemed” rather than on the face 
value of the coupons.  28 U.S.C.  § 1712(a).  Although we do 
not deal with a coupon settlement, this statutory provision 
further supports the proposition that the actual benefit 
provided to the class is an important consideration when 
determining attorneys’ fees. 
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In this case, class counsel, and not their client, may be 
the foremost beneficiaries of the settlement.  Some class 
actions are based on so-called negative value claims, that is, 
claims that could not be brought on an individual basis 
because the transaction costs of bringing an individual action 
exceed the potential relief.  While aggregating these claims in 
a class action may have an important deterrent value, there is 
a concern that those actions are brought primarily to benefit 
class counsel, and awarding disproportionate class counsel 
fees only incentivizes that behavior.  Cy pres awards—by 
ensuring that a settlement fund is sufficiently large to 
command a substantial attorneys’ fee—can exacerbate this 
problem.  See Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 356 F.3d 781, 
784–85 (7th Cir. 2004); Martin H. Redish et al., Cy Pres 
Relief and the Pathologies of the Modern Class Action: A 
Normative and Empirical Analysis, 62 Fla. L. Rev. 617, 621–
22, 649 (2010).  Although, as noted, this class action had the 
potential to compensate class members significantly, the 
current distribution of settlement funds arguably 
overcompensates class counsel at the expense of the class. 
We recognize the difficulty a district court faces in 
deciding when attorneys’ fees should be reduced on this 
basis.  In evaluating a fee award, it should begin by 
determining with reasonable accuracy the distribution of 
funds that will result from the claims process.  This may 
require it “to delay a final assessment of the fee award to 
withhold all or a substantial part of the fee until the 
distribution process is complete.”  Federal Judicial Center, 
Manual for Complex Litigation § 21.71 (4th ed. 2008).  That 
court should then, relying on the Gunter/Prudential factors 
and its experience, determine whether the level of distribution 
provided to the class by the settlement reflects a failure of 
class counsel to represent adequately the interests of the entire 
class.  We note that the use of a lodestar cross-check may be 
helpful, although not necessarily determinative, in making 
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this determination.14
IV. Class Notice 
  Having framed the relevant inquiry, we 
leave the determination of the appropriate fee award to the 
District Court, which is more familiar with the performance 
and skill of counsel, the nature and history of the litigation, 
and the merits of the lawsuits.  
After initially approving the settlement, but before 
giving final approval, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23(e)(1) requires a district court to “direct notice in a 
reasonable manner to all class members who would be bound 
by the proposal.”  Although the Rule provides broad 
discretion to district courts with respect to the notice’s form 
and content, it must satisfy the requirements of due process.  
Zimmer Paper Prods., Inc. v. Berger & Montague, P.C., 758 
F.2d 86, 90 (3d Cir. 1985).  Generally speaking, the notice 
should contain sufficient information to enable class members 
to make informed decisions on whether they should take steps 
to protect their rights, including objecting to the settlement or, 
when relevant, opting out of the class.  See Rodriguez v. West 
Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 962–63 (9th Cir. 2009); Masters, 
473 F.3d at 438; Petrovic v. Amoco Oil Co., 200 F.3d 1140, 
1153 (8th Cir. 1999); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales 
Practices Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 326 (3d Cir. 1998); 3 Herbert 
                                              
14 This case demonstrates why use of the lodestar is helpful 
but not outcome determinative.  As noted, the District Court 
calculated a lodestar of $31,839,355.33 at regular billing 
rates, and the fees awarded represented a negative lodestar 
multiplier of .37.  This suggests that class counsel would not 
be overpaid for their services if compensated as requested, 
but it also suggests that counsel has a significant financial 
incentive to cut its losses and settle the lawsuits. 
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B. Newberg et al., Newberg on Class Actions § 8:32 (4th ed. 
2012). 
Young contends that the settlement notice was 
inadequate because it did not identify the cy pres recipients 
who will receive excess settlement funds.15
                                              
15 Young also asserts that the settlement notice fails because it 
indicates that a potentially valid proof of purchase—certain 
forms of photographic evidence—is invalid.  Young became 
aware of that photographic evidence might be permissible at 
the fairness hearing several months before the District Court 
gave final approval to the settlement.  Because he failed to 
raise this issue before the Court, it is waived on appeal.  
Franki Found. Co. v. Alger-Rau & Assocs., Inc., 513 F.2d 
581, 586 (3d Cir. 1975).  We are unclear, however, whether 
photographic evidence actually is valid proof of purchase 
under the settlement.  On remand, the Court, taking into 
account any changes to the settlement, should clarify the 
types of evidence that are valid.  If that evidence materially 
differs from the evidence described as valid in the class 
notice, the Court should require that a supplemental notice be 
provided to the class. 
  His primary 
concern is that unnamed class members will not have the 
opportunity to object to the selection of the cy pres recipients, 
who are intended to serve as proxies for the class members’ 
interests.  While a valid concern, failure to identify the cy 
pres recipients is not a due process violation.  Class members 
know there is a possibility of a cy pres award and that the 
Court will select among recipients proposed by the parties at 
a later date.  This knowledge is adequate to allow any 
interested class member to keep apprised of the cy pres 
recipient selection process.  We are confident the Court will 
ensure the parties make their proposals publicly available and 
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will allow class members the opportunity to object before it 
makes a selection.16
The delayed naming of cy pres recipients presents a 
more nuanced issue with respect to the opportunity of class 
members to appeal the Court’s selection of cy pres recipients.  
As the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has recently 
explained,  
 
                                              
16 Courts generally require the parties to identify “a recipient 
whose interests reasonably approximate those being pursued 
by the class.”  ALI, Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litig. 
§ 3.07.  In this case, the Court indicated that it would select a 
cy pres recipient (from among the organizations proposed by 
the parties) that satisfies this standard.  “[H]aving judges 
decide how to distribute cy pres awards both taxes judicial 
resources and risks creating the appearance of judicial 
impropriety.”  In re Lupron Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 
677 F.3d 21, 38 (1st Cir. 2012).  The judicial role is better 
limited to approving cy pres recipients selected by the parties.  
While we do not decide today whether approving a settlement 
with the cy pres selection process envisioned by the parties in 
this case is an abuse of discretion, we join other courts and 
commentators in expressing our concern with district courts 
selecting cy pres recipients.  See id. at 38–39; Nachshin v. 
AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he 
specter of judges and outside entities dealing in the 
distribution and solicitation of settlement money may create 
the appearance of impropriety.”); ALI, Principles of the Law 
of Aggregate Litig. § 3.07(c) (“The court, when feasible, 
should require the parties to identify a recipient whose 
interests reasonably approximate those being pursued by the 
class.”). 
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[o]nly parties to a civil action may 
appeal from a final judgment. . . .  
The Supreme Court has 
recognized only one exception to 
this rule:  that “nonnamed class 
members . . . who have objected 
in a timely manner to approval of 
the settlement at the fairness 
hearing have the power to bring 
an appeal without first 
intervening.” . . . The question 
then becomes whether Devlin [v. 
Scardelletti], which created an 
exception for unnamed class 
members who have objected to 
settlement agreements, extends to 
this situation in which unnamed 
class members have objected to a 
cy pres distribution.  
In re Lupron, 677 F.3d at 29–30 (second alteration in 
original) (quoting and citing Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 
1, 7, 14 (2002)).  The First Circuit did not resolve whether 
class members objecting to a cy pres distribution are 
permitted to appeal without intervening, and we are unaware 
of any court of appeals that has done so. 
Despite this uncertainty, we believe the notice 
provided to class members here satisfies the requirements of 
due process.  Even without a Devlin exception, to the extent 
putative class members have a property interest in the 
unclaimed funds and object to the cy pres recipients selected, 
they may typically intervene in the lawsuit for purposes of 
appealing an eventual order directing a cy pres distribution.  
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2); see also Devlin, 536 U.S. at 20 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the Devlin exception as 
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unnecessary because “class members will typically meet the 
requirements for intervention as of right under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 24, including intervention only for the 
purpose of appeal, and even after the class judgment has been 
entered”).  We believe intervention will prove sufficient to 
protect the interests of unnamed class members in appealing 
the selection of cy pres recipients.  And if it does not, they 
may ask us to determine whether it is appropriate to create a 
new Devlin exception allowing them to appeal.   
V. Conclusion 
We summarize our rulings. 
1. We vacate the District Court’s orders approving 
settlement and the fund allocation plan because 
the Court did not have the necessary factual 
information to determine whether the settlement 
will provide sufficient direct benefit to the class. 
2. We vacate the Court’s order awarding 
attorneys’ fees and costs because this award 
was based on the now-vacated settlement.  We 
confirm that the Court may, in its discretion, 
reduce attorneys’ fees based on the level of 
direct benefit provided to the class.  
3. We do not require that a corrected notice be 
sent to class members because we do not 
believe that the notice provided was inadequate.  
We note, however, that supplemental notice 
should be provided to the class if the settlement 
is materially altered on remand.    
